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An 8 September message from the chief of staff of the North Korean 21st Brigade in western Korea to subordinate units ordered a complete dossier drawn up on "officers whose permanent address is in China." Items to be listed are service in the Chinese Communist Army, rank held, and address and family connections.

On 13 September the 22nd Brigade in northeastern Korea was also ordered to make up a similar roster by 15 September. (CANOE IL T-602, 8 Sept; IL T-756, 13 Sept 52)

Comment: These messages indicate that North Korean officers with a Chinese background are being identified wherever they are in the North Korean Army. Although highly speculative, it is possible that the long-standing antagonism, largely dormant, between Chinese, Soviet and native North Korean officers is behind this move.

Analysis by a US Air Force field unit of messages on the North Korean aircraft is limited to take-offs, landings, and occasional communication checks. For daytime flights, on the other hand, the ground controller directs all maneuvers. From 1 to 10 September, 992 aircraft calls were heard on the Korean GCI net, representing a new high for such a period.

The embryonic North Korean air defense system became active again on 5 August with early warning messages being passed. Since then North Korean flights have been increasing along the North Korean border area. Possibly concurrent with recent changes in both the Soviet and Chinese grid locating systems in Korea, on 9 September a Korean ground station identified UN aircraft in "Zone 46." This is the first time that a two-digit grid designator has been heard on the Korean air defense system and may indicate an expansion of coverage. (CANOE AP 964, NK Air Voice Sp Rpt 24, 10 Sept 52)

7. Enemy fears grow to include major UN land, air and sea offensive: In a 14 September message, headquarters of the North Korean 9th Division, on the line in eastern coastal

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Korea, cited "information gathered from the Supreme Combined Command" which was interpreted as indicating an imminent UN land offensive. The evidence listed by the Supreme Headquarters included extensive air reconnaissance and bombing requests in the east by ROK I Corps elements and the US 45th Division, the presence with the US 25th Division of "the combined unit which was in Japan," the receipt of tanks by "ROK units. . .deployed at the central front," the increased UN usage of smoke shells, and heightened troop and transport activity in the US 25th Division sector.

In Hwanghae Province in the west, a Chinese artillery unit reported, also on 14 September, that the 63rd Army, alerted for a UN amphibious operation, decided that an area northwest of Kaesong would be the "drop zone." Similarly, in the northeast, a North Korean antiaircraft artillery officer reported on the same day that he had returned from the coastal security 46th Division with plans for defense against the enemy landings and coordinated parachute drops in the Hamhung defense area. (CANOE IL T-761, L T-550, IL T-760, 14 Sept 52)

Comment: Enemy fears of a major coordinated UN offensive in Korea appear to have reached a new all-time high. Available material suggests that the enemy envisages a one-division amphibious landing on the Ongjin Peninsula coordinated with a three-division ground offensive and an airborne force to isolate Kaesong. In the east, a three-division ground offensive toward Wonsan, coupled with an amphibious landing and an airborne operation in the Hamhung area, is expected. References to UN units in the center indicate that the enemy expects a strong holding action there.

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